The order

On November 16, 2026, Chief Judge Colm F. Connolly entered a memorandum order in Koninklijke Philips N.V. v. Quectel Wireless Solutions Co. Ltd., Civil Action No. 20-1707-CFC, in the District of Delaware. The caption also names Eagle Electronics Inc. as a defendant. Philips filed the action on December 17, 2020. The order is directed to the second amended complaint, which the order calls the Complaint, at D.I. 201.

Quectel Wireless Solutions Co. Ltd. moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3), at D.I. 232, to dismiss Count V of that complaint. The court wrote: "Although I am not persuaded by the arguments Quectel makes in support of its motion, I 'have an independent obligation to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists,'" citing Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006), "and I have concluded that I lack subject matter jurisdiction over Count V. I will therefore dismiss Count V and deny Quectel's motion as moot."

The modules and the standards

The order states that Quectel manufactures cellular Internet of Things (IoT) modules that enable IoT devices to collect and share data over the internet and through wireless communication networks. Three generations are relevant: the Global System for Mobile (GSM or 2G), the Universal Mobile Telecommunications Service (UMTS or 3G), and the Long-Term Evolution (LTE or 4G). The order states that cellular networks rely on technological interoperability standards that set protocols and design parameters so that products made by different manufacturers can work together, and that the standards for 3G and 4G were developed by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), sponsored by seven telecommunication standards organizations. Philips is a member of one of those organizations, the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). Quectel is not a member of ETSI.

The order states: "It is undisputed that Quectel makes modules that practice 3GPP standards for 3G and 4G adopted by ETSI." The order also states that Philips does not allege that Quectel has ever manufactured modules that practice the 2G standard. It notes Philips's allegation, at paragraph 14 of the second amended complaint, that Philips manufactured cellular phones in the early 2000s that practiced the 2G standard.

The first four counts

The order states that in each of the first four counts, Philips accuses Quectel of infringing a patent Philips owns. It quotes Philips's allegation that "[t]he devices claimed in the [four] Asserted Patents have proved to be of great importance to the field of digital cellular communications including 3G UMTS and/or 4G LTE cellular standards established by ETSI and 3GPP."

Count V

Count V seeks a "declaratory judgment related to FRAND license and royalties." The order states that FRAND stands for fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory. The count is paragraphs 166 through 170 of the second amended complaint. Paragraph 166 repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs.

As the order sets them out, paragraph 167 alleges that, "[a]s discussed above, Quectel has demanded and exercised its third-party beneficiary rights against Philips to obtain a FRAND license, all the while delaying and avoiding paying a FRAND royalty for continuing use of Philips' technology." It alleges that Philips has repeatedly offered to license rights to its world-wide portfolio, including the asserted patents and others, and that Quectel has not accepted those offers. It alleges that Philips's offers "have been on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory ('FRAND') terms, pursuant to ETSI policy and Philips' declarations."

Paragraph 168 alleges that, despite notice in 2015 of the asserted patents and others in Philips's world-wide portfolio, followed by years of additional communications in which Philips offered and demonstrated its willingness to provide a worldwide license in those patents to Quectel, Quectel "has steadfastly refused to accept Philips' FRAND licensing offers and acted as a 'hold out' while infringing Philips' patents in a manner consistent with an 'efficient infringement' tactical approach."

Paragraph 169 alleges that Quectel has asserted and accepted its third-party beneficiary rights "to obtain a FRAND license, effectively promising that it will enter a FRAND license once the FRAND royalty can be determined." It alleges that Quectel's statements and behavior "have made an enforceable promise and commitment by Quectel that it will enter into license with Philips on FRAND terms and royalties, which are capable of being determined, including by a jury," and that, in asserting and accepting those rights, Quectel must accept the obligations that come with them, "including paying a FRAND royalty awarded by a jury."

Paragraph 170 alleges that an actual controversy exists between Philips and Quectel over whether Quectel has demanded and exercised its third-party beneficiary rights, "including the obligation to pay a FRAND royalty," and, if so, "what FRAND royalty, including interest, is owed by Quectel for a license to Philips' 2G, 3G, and 4G SEP worldwide portfolio," for both Quectel's past sales and future sales.

The complaint requests a declaratory judgment "that Quectel asserted and accepted its third[-]party beneficiary rights to a FRAND license, promising to enter a license on FRAND terms, which can be determined, and a declaration of the FRAND royalties and terms, including interest, for Quectel to license Philips' 2G, 3G, and 4G worldwide SEP portfolio." The court wrote that the complaint does not define "SEP," that in other settings the parties have used that term as an acronym for "Standard Essential Patents," and that the court assumes Philips meant "SEP worldwide portfolio" to refer to its patents that it has publicly declared practice the standards for 2G, 3G, and 4G adopted by ETSI.

The jurisdictional framework

The order quotes Rule 12(h)(3): "If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." It states that the party asserting federal jurisdiction, when jurisdiction is challenged, has the burden of establishing it, citing DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 n.3 (2006), and Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).

Philips alleges jurisdiction over Count V pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. 2201, at paragraph 19 of the second amended complaint and at page 4 of D.I. 244. Citing Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Stevens & Ricci Inc., 835 F.3d 388, 394 (3d Cir. 2016), the order states that the Act "does not itself create an independent basis for federal jurisdiction but instead provides a remedy for controversies otherwise properly within the court's subject matter jurisdiction."

No justiciable controversy

The court wrote that the first substantive clause of Count V alleges that, "[a]s discussed above," Quectel demanded and exercised third-party beneficiary rights, and that there is no such discussion in the preceding paragraphs. The words "third-party" and "beneficiary" do not appear in the first 165 paragraphs. The only rights and benefits those paragraphs allege with respect to Quectel, the court wrote, concern Delaware law and retail sales. Paragraph 20 alleges that personal jurisdiction over Quectel exists because it "has availed itself of the rights and benefits of Delaware law." Paragraph 21 alleges that personal jurisdiction over Quectel exists because it "economically benefits from the retail sale of infringing products in the State of Delaware."

The court wrote that nothing in Count V, or in the paragraphs it incorporates, identifies a source of the alleged third-party beneficiary rights or of the obligations Philips says flow from those rights. The court stated: "Presumably because Philips knows that there is no contract, statute, or other legal source that imposes on Quectel an obligation to obtain from Philips a license to Philips' SEP worldwide portfolio, the terms of the declaratory judgment Philips asks me to issue do not compel Quectel to enter such a license." The court held: "Philips' failure to allege, let alone demonstrate, that Quectel has a legal obligation to obtain a license from Philips dooms Count V, as it means there is no justiciable controversy between Philips and Quectel."

A footnote addresses paragraph 173 of the second amended complaint. That paragraph alleges that Quectel has a third-party beneficiary right to license Philips's "worldwide SEP portfolio" under ETSI's "IPR Policy" and "Philips' FRAND declarations to ETSI." The court wrote that paragraph 173 is part of Count VI, that Count V does not incorporate Count VI, and that the complaint does not allege that Quectel was obligated by contract, statute, or any other legal authority to obtain from Philips a FRAND license for Philips's worldwide SEP portfolio. The court wrote that this failure is fatal to Count V.

The court also wrote that Philips alleges it has offered a FRAND license to Quectel and that Quectel refuses to accept that offer. Citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239-40 and 240-41 (1937), and MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007), the court wrote that the Declaratory Judgment Act "is operative only in respect to controversies which are such in the constitutional sense," and that a controversy must "touch[] the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests." The court concluded that Philips has not shown or even alleged legal relations that make Philips's desire that Quectel accept Philips's offer of a putative FRAND license, and Quectel's refusal to agree to that license, adverse legal interests. The order states: "Accordingly, it has not met its burden to establish the existence of a justiciable controversy under Article III."

The disposition

The order is dated at Wilmington on November 16, 2026, and it is signed by Colm F. Connolly, Chief Judge. It orders that Count V of the second amended complaint is dismissed, and that Quectel's motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3), D.I. 232, is denied as moot. The decretal paragraphs read: "1. Count V of the Second Amended Complaint is DISMISSED; and 2. Defendant Quectel Wireless Solutions Co. Ltd.'s Motion to Dismiss Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3) (D.I. 232) is DENIED AS MOOT."

The pending motions

On November 4, 2026, Philips requested oral argument on pending motions, including a motion for summary judgment of no invalidity, a motion for summary judgment concerning Quectel's counterclaims Nos. 1 and 2, a motion for summary judgment regarding Philips's unfair competition and unjust enrichment claims, a summary judgment motion captioned "Any FRAND Royalty Must Be Based On Philips's Established IoT Rate," a motion for summary judgment of indefiniteness, and motions to exclude expert testimony. On November 9, 2026, Judge Colm F. Connolly held oral argument.

What to watch next

Watch for any written ruling on the motions identified in the November 4 request for oral argument, and for any further order on the counts this memorandum order does not address. The case can end at any time, including by settlement or voluntary dismissal.