District Judge Rodney Gilstrap signed a memorandum opinion and order on November 13, 2026, in Iarnach Technologies Ltd. v. Charter Communications, Inc., No. 2:24-cv-00230-JRG (E.D. Tex., Marshall Division), Dkt. No. 170. The defendants are Charter Communications, Inc., Charter Communications Holding Company, LLC, Charter Communications Operating, LLC, Spectrum Management Holding Company, LLC, and Spectrum Gulf Coast, LLC. The order uses "Charter" for those defendants together. The order says the court considered the briefing, the documents submitted, and the parties' arguments at a hearing on the motions held on September 21, 2026.
The three motions
The order decides competing summary judgment motions on whether Iarnach must grant Charter a royalty free license to the patents in suit, and Charter's motion to disqualify Iarnach's retained technical expert. The docket entry for the order describes Iarnach's Dkt. No. 143 as a motion for partial summary judgment that the defendants are not licensed under the agreement between the patents' original owner and a standards organization, and Charter's Dkt. No. 144 as a motion for partial summary judgment. It describes Dkt. No. 108 as a motion to disqualify the expert and to prevent the expert from accessing Charter's confidential information. All three motions were filed under seal. The order grants Dkt. No. 143, denies Dkt. No. 144, and denies Dkt. No. 108. It says the motions turn on whether the patents' original owner, which the order calls Iarnach's predecessor to the patents in suit, assigned to Iarnach the rights created in two agreements. The court found no genuine dispute of material fact that the original owner never assigned or attempted to assign the rights in the first of those agreements to Iarnach.
The patents and the two agreements
The order says Iarnach sued Charter in 2024, accusing it of infringing U.S. Patent Nos. 9,287,982 and 9,674,035, and that Iarnach is not the original owner of the patents: it acquired them from the original owner in 2022. U.S. Patent 9,287,982, titled "DPOE System and Service Auto-Configuration Method and Network Based Thereon," issued on March 15, 2016. U.S. Patent 9,674,035, titled "Seamless Configuration Update for Optical Network Unit in Ethernet Passive Optical Network," issued on June 6, 2017.
Several years earlier, in 2010, the original owner executed what the order calls the First Agreement, a license agreement in favor of a standards organization that the order describes as the organization in charge of developing and maintaining the Data over Cable Service Interface Specification Provisioning of Ethernet Passive Optical Networks (DPoE) specifications. The order says the two signed it while working together on Cable Data Services Specifications, as part of a data services standard setting process, and that it required the original owner to license its patents at "royalty free, no cost" rates. The order says the First Agreement also reached "future" patents the original owner had not yet acquired, and it quotes the agreement: the original owner "agree[d] to make licenses . . . available for . . . Essential Claims on a royalty free, no cost terms and conditions to any Third Party that desires to implement or has implemented any . . . Cable Data Services Specification." The USPTO thereafter issued the asserted patents in 2016 and 2017. In 2022, the order says, Iarnach purchased the patents in suit from the original owner under a Patent Purchase Agreement, which the order calls the Second Agreement. As part of that agreement, the original owner represented that the asserted patents were being transferred "free and clear" of any "pledges, . . . standards' obligations or other encumbrances."
The royalty free obligation did not follow the patents
Charter's motion asked the court to hold that Iarnach is bound by the original owner's royalty free, no cost licensing obligation. Charter argued, as the order describes it, that a choice of law clause in the Second Agreement applies German law, and that under German law the original owner's commitment in the First Agreement was an "in rem" FRAND (Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory) obligation that affixed to the asserted patents and followed them to Iarnach. The order notes that Charter refers to FRAND and RAND interchangeably. Charter also argued that this application of German law is consistent with U.S. patent law and that it should prevail under German or U.S. law. Iarnach argued that the German law selection clause is irrelevant because Charter does "not bring a contract dispute" under the Second Agreement, that even if German law governed it would require the court to apply U.S. law, and that the original owner's obligation to grant royalty free, no cost licenses neither burdened nor transferred with the patents in suit when Iarnach bought them.
The court agreed with Charter that German law governs the original owner's assignment of the asserted patents to Iarnach under the Second Agreement, which it wrote unambiguously specifies German law in section 9.6, and it analyzed the dispute under both German and U.S. law, finding that in either case Iarnach should prevail. Charter relied principally on Unwired Planet v. Huawei, decided by the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court on March 22, 2019, case 1-2 U 31/16. The court wrote that the decision does not answer the dispositive question: whether the original owner's "royalty free, no cost" commitment passed to Iarnach automatically or had to be expressly assigned. It wrote that the obligation to grant a royalty free license is not a FRAND commitment, which even upon favorable FRAND terms involves some licensing fee paid to the patent owner, not a free license, and that Unwired Planet v. Huawei did not hold that every contractual commitment to license a patent always and automatically attaches to the patent so as to bind later owners in the chain of title. The court wrote that Charter does not cite persuasive authority, German or U.S., that a contractual free licensing commitment between discrete parties equals a FRAND obligation, or that a negotiated contract's option for a free license should be treated as one.
The court then examined the First Agreement itself. Section 3.2 contains the disputed "royalty free, no cost" language. The court wrote that, under section 9.3, the obligation could be assigned to a successor only if the original owner first obtained the standards organization's written consent, and that any attempt to assign those rights without that consent would "be void and of no effect." It distinguished that clause from usual FRAND provisions in other standards agreements that bind successors-in-interest by design, quoting an example: "FRAND licensing undertakings made pursuant to Clause 6 shall be interpreted as encumbrances that bind all successors-in-interest." The order says the parties do not dispute that the original owner never assigned or attempted to assign the First Agreement to Iarnach. It cites Iarnach's statement that the standards organization did not receive a request for written consent to assign the agreement to Iarnach, and Charter's representation that it does not dispute that fact. The court denied Charter's motion and found the First Agreement's assignment provision controlling. In sum, it wrote, the First Agreement's assignment requirements "are unambiguous and prevent the automatic conveyance of the royalty free provision without an express assignment consented to in advance" by the standards organization, the provision never transferred to Iarnach "via the Second Agreement or otherwise," and this "precludes the relief which Charter seeks."
The court reached the same conclusion under U.S. law. It wrote that the cases Charter cites, TransCore, LP v. Elec. Transaction Consultants Corp., 563 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2009), and Innovus Prime, LLC v. Panasonic Corp., No. C-12-00660-RMW, 2013 WL 3354390 (N.D. Cal. July 2, 2013), explained what happened when an encumbrance to a patent existed, and do not establish that the First Agreement creates an encumbrance in the first instance. Charter's last argument, as the order describes it, was the premise that "one cannot convey what one does not own," from TransCore, along with Datatreasury Corp. v. Wells Fargo & Co., 522 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2008), which the order quotes for the rule that an assignee takes a patent subject to the legal encumbrances on it. The court agreed with that general principle but wrote that it is not at issue; the language of the two agreements is. The court wrote that "this fact-specific case is not a FRAND case involving SEP patents, which might have entailed a different analysis," and that the fact that Charter could have been entitled to a free license if and when the original owner had assigned the obligation does not change these specific facts, citing Daingean Technologies Ltd. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 2:23-cv-00347-JRG-RSP, Dkt. No. 386, at *5 (E.D. Tex. May 13, 2025).
Iarnach's motion, Dkt. No. 143, asked for summary judgment that Charter does not have and is not entitled under these facts to a royalty free, no cost license. The court granted it, consistent with its analysis of Charter's motion. It wrote that there is no genuine dispute of fact that the original owner never obtained consent to assign, or attempted to assign, its agreement with the standards organization to Iarnach, and that this is confirmed by the original owner's representation in the Second Agreement that the patents in suit are transferred free and clear of any prior obligation. The order states the summary judgment standard it applied, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a): summary judgment should be granted only "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
The technical expert
The court denied Charter's motion to disqualify Iarnach's retained technical expert. The order says that on March 2, 2025, Iarnach disclosed that it intended to use the expert as an "expert consultant"; that from 1998 until 2023 the expert held several consulting positions for Charter, including being hired by Charter in August 2014 to design and manage a new laboratory called the Charter Technology & Engineering Center; and that the expert spent 13 years at the standards organization that, the order says, is in charge of developing and maintaining the DPoE specifications. Charter argued, as the order recounts it, that the expert was Charter's employee for over a decade and maintained a confidential relationship with Charter, and that when the asserted patents issued the expert was working at Charter's Advanced Engineering Labs on a laboratory network representing the end-to-end capabilities of Charter's deployed network, including DOCSIS back-office equipment and optical line terminal and optical network unit devices. Charter argued that this mattered because Iarnach has identified optical line terminals (OLTs), optical network units (ONUs), and DOCSIS back office equipment as the accused instrumentalities.
Iarnach responded, as the order recounts it, that the expert had sworn that DPoE-related tests were performed in a different lab, at a different location, which the expert could not access; that the expert did not test DPoE network equipment, including optical line terminals or optical network units, at the Charter Technology & Engineering Center; and that the expert was not part of internal meetings on future business strategies or new DPoE techniques, did not have access to a confidential document repository, and did not obtain Charter's privileged information. The court applied the Fifth Circuit test from Koch Ref. Co. v. Jennifer L. Boudreau M/V, 85 F.3d 1178 (5th Cir. 1996): whether the opposing party had a confidential relationship with the expert, and whether that party disclosed confidential or privileged information relevant to the case. The party seeking disqualification bears the burden, and the expert is disqualified only if both parts are met. The court found that Charter has not established disclosure of confidential or privileged information relevant to this case that would warrant disqualification. It found that any information previously disclosed "was limited to technical information regarding how various standards and products operated, rather than confidential and strategic information that would warrant exclusion," and it quoted Koch for the statement that "purely technical information is not confidential." The motion is denied. The order says Charter may seek a motion in limine that addresses the expert's prior employment with Charter.
The stay and the next scheduling order
The order states: "Iarnach's motion (Dkt. No. 143) is GRANTED and Charter's motions (Dkt. Nos. 108, 144) are DENIED. Given the stay that existed while these issues were addressed, the Court ORDERS that within seven (7) days of this Order, the parties shall file a jointly proposed Docket Control Order for the Court's consideration and action." The case can end at any time, including by settlement or voluntary dismissal.