On November 20, 2026, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided In re Ollnova Technologies Ltd., No. 2025-1512. The opinion states: "NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential." Judge Cunningham wrote the opinion. Judge Stark filed a concurrence and joined the opinion in full. The panel was Judges Chen, Cunningham, and Stark. The appeal is from the Patent Trial and Appeal Board in Nos. IPR2023-00626 and IPR2024-00131. Ollnova Technologies Ltd. appeals a final written decision in an inter partes review brought by Copeland Comfort Control LP and ecobee Technologies ULC. The disposition line is "AFFIRMED".

The opinion states that the Board determined that claims 1, 3-8, 14, 15, and 18 of U.S. Patent No. 7,746,887 are unpatentable as obvious. It cites Copeland Comfort Control LP v. Ollnova Techs. Ltd., No. IPR2023-00626, 2024 WL 4362279, at *21 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 1, 2024), and J.A. 47-48. It states that Ollnova timely appealed, and that the court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A).

The opinion grants ecobee's unopposed motion to withdraw from the appeal, citing ECF No. 52, and states that the court earlier granted Copeland's similar motion, citing ECF Nos. 24 and 25. It states that, at the time the court is deciding the case, the only party involved is Ollnova. It states that the prior positions of ecobee and Copeland, and the prior agreement between Ollnova and ecobee that the Board's construction of "suspended" was incorrect, are inoperative and of no consequence for purposes of this appeal. The caption names Ollnova Technologies Ltd. as the appellant.

Claim 1 of the '887 patent

The opinion states that the '887 patent is titled "Dynamic Value Reporting for Wireless Automated Systems," citing the patent at [54]. It sets out claim 1 as illustrative, citing the patent at column 14, line 48, through column 15, line 4, and certificates of correction at J.A. 125-26.

Claim 1, as the patent prints it at column 14, line 48, through column 15, line 4, with the two changes made by certificates of correction, recites: "A wireless automation device, comprising: a transceiver operable to wirelessly communicate packets of information over a wireless network; a sensor operable to generate a indicator for a sensed condition; a controller configured to poll the sensor at a polling interval to read the indicator during a current period of the polling interval and to selectively operate the transceiver to communicate information associated with the reading of the indicator; and a memory, the controller storing a reading of the indicator during the current period in the memory, where the memory stores at least one prior reading of the indicator, the prior reading of the indicator made during a prior period of the polling interval, wherein the transceiver is configured to transmit a most recent reading of the indicator stored in the memory during a period of a transmission interval in response to detecting a change in the sensed condition outside a predetermined range and wherein transmission of the most recent reading of the indicator stored in the memory during the period of the transmission interval is suspended in response to detecting a change in the sensed condition within the predetermined range." The patent as printed reads "associated reading of the indicator" in the controller clause and "chance" in the last clause. A certificate of correction signed March 22, 2022 changes the first to "associated with the reading of the indicator," and a certificate of correction signed February 8, 2022 changes "chance" to "change."

The Board's construction of "suspended"

The opinion states that the Board construed part of the last clause of claim 1, the clause that begins "wherein the transceiver is configured to transmit." It identifies that clause, from column 14, line 63, through column 15, line 4, as limitation [1.e]. The second "wherein" statement in that limitation, which the opinion quotes, is: "wherein transmission of the most recent reading of the indicator stored in the memory during the period of the transmission interval is suspended in response to detecting a change in the sensed condition within the predetermined range."

The opinion states that the Board observed that a district court in parallel litigation had already construed that limitation as "wherein the transmission of the most recent reading of the indicator that would otherwise occur is stopped for the remainder of the transmission interval in response to detecting a change in the sensed condition within the predetermined range," citing the Board decision at *4 and footnote 8. The Board did not adopt the district court's construction. The opinion states that the Board said neither party asserted that construction.

A footnote states that the parallel district court case was brought by Ollnova against ecobee, and that Copeland was not a party to that litigation. It cites J.A. 1920 as listing only Ollnova and ecobee as parties in the district court's April 10, 2023 claim construction order. The footnote states that after the court issued its opinion in a related appeal from the district court's judgment, Ollnova Techs. Ltd. v. ecobee Techs. ULC, 177 F.4th 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2026), on remand, Ollnova and ecobee settled. The citation it gives for that point is Ollnova Techs. Ltd. v. ecobee Techs. ULC, 2:22-cv-00072-JRG (E.D. Tex. filed July 14, 2026).

The opinion states that Ollnova proposed a similar, but immaterially different, construction, and that the proposal excluded "for the remainder of the transmission interval" from the district court's construction. It states that the Board rejected Ollnova's proposed limitation [1.e] construction, which reads, in part, "transmission of the most recent reading of the indicator that would otherwise occur is stopped." Copeland asserted plain and ordinary meaning. The Board determined that the meaning of "suspended," in the context of the '887 patent, "encompasses both where a transmission that would otherwise occur is suspended by an action such as overriding a flag and where a transmission is not made because there is no change in an indicator or a change does not exceed a limit."

Judge Stark's concurrence states that there was a dispute at the Board as to the meaning of "suspend." It states that Ollnova asked the Board to adopt a slight variation of the district court's construction, while the petitioners advocated "plain and ordinary meaning." For the petitioners' position it cites ecobee Techs. ULC v. Ollnova Techs. Ltd., No. IPR2024-00131 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 2, 2023), Paper 1 at 13-14.

The Board's obviousness determinations

The opinion states that the Board determined that claim 1 was unpatentable as obvious over Kates-711, which the opinion identifies as U.S. Patent No. 7,528,711, citing the Board decision at *13 and J.A. 47-48. The Board found that Kates-711 teaches limitation [1.e] because, as the opinion quotes the Board, Kates-711 discloses "not transmitting data that falls within a normal range" and transmitting data that is "outside the threshold," such as "a high threshold, a low threshold, or a high-low threshold," quoting Kates-711 at column 13, lines 14-23.

The opinion states that the Board further found that "transmit report" block 707 in Figure 7 of Kates-711 "corresponds to the recited 'a period of the transmission interval' because it is a period of time when 'sensor data is . . . sent to the monitoring computer,'" citing Kates-711 at column 15, line 61. The Board found that block 707 is within an interval of "periodic monitoring," the process loop in Figure 7 beginning at block 703 and comprising steps 703, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, and back to block 703. The opinion states that the Board credited expert testimony in finding that Kates-711's periodic monitoring disclosed a "transmission interval" claimed in limitation [1.e]. The Board rejected Ollnova's argument that block 707 cannot disclose a transmission interval because block 707 does not exist when transmission is suspended. The Board found instead that "block 707 is part of a loop when transmission may or may not occur depending on whether the sensed data is anomalous."

The opinion states that the Board found that Kates-711 teaches limitation [1.e], and that it determined claims 1, 3-8, and 18 are unpatentable as obvious in light of Kates-711 and in light of Kates-711 in combination with Hitt. The opinion identifies Hitt as U.S. Patent Application Pub. No. 2004/0100394. It states that the Board also determined that claims 1, 3-8, 14, 15, and 18 are unpatentable as obvious in light of Kates-711 in combination with Littrell, or in combination with both Hitt and Littrell. The opinion identifies Littrell as U.S. Patent Application Pub. No. 2005/0246593. It cites the Board decision at *21 and J.A. 46-48, which it describes as a summary chart of the Board's determinations.

The three arguments on appeal

The opinion states that Ollnova makes three primary arguments. First, the Board erred in its construction of "suspended," citing the appellant's brief at 28-42. Second, Kates-711 does not disclose, teach, or suggest a "transmission interval," citing pages 42-46. Third, Kates-711 does not disclose, teach, or suggest a "period of the transmission interval" during which "transmission . . . is suspended," citing pages 46-49. A footnote states that the arguments on claim construction and obviousness are made with respect to claim 1, and that Ollnova does not make any arguments unique to dependent claims 3-8, 14, 15, or 18, which the Board also found unpatentable.

The opinion states the review it applies. It quotes Game & Tech. Co. v. Wargaming Grp. Ltd., 942 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2019): "We review the Board's legal conclusions de novo and its fact findings for substantial evidence." It quotes Immunex Corp. v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLC, 977 F.3d 1212, 1217 (Fed. Cir. 2020): "We review the Board's claim construction de novo and any underlying factual findings for substantial evidence." It quotes Redline Detection, LLC v. Star Envirotech, Inc., 811 F.3d 435, 449 (Fed. Cir. 2015), for the statement that whether a claimed invention is unpatentable as obvious is a question of law reviewed de novo, based on underlying findings of fact reviewed for substantial evidence. It quotes FanDuel, Inc. v. Interactive Games LLC, 966 F.3d 1334, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2020): "Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." It also quotes OSI Pharms., LLC v. Apotex Inc., 939 F.3d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2019): the substantial-evidence standard asks whether a reasonable fact finder could have arrived at the agency's decision, and it involves examination of the record as a whole, taking into account evidence that both justifies and detracts from an agency's decision.

Collateral estoppel and the district court's construction

The opinion describes three challenges to the construction of limitation [1.e]. Ollnova argued that issue preclusion, that is, collateral estoppel, precluded ecobee from asserting a construction of "suspended" inconsistent with the construction from the prior adjudication in the Eastern District of Texas. Ollnova argued that the Board disregarded the district court's construction, which Ollnova insists is a correct construction. Ollnova argued that the Board incorrectly construed "suspended."

On collateral estoppel, the opinion states that the court need not decide whether ecobee is collaterally estopped, for at least two reasons. First, ecobee is no longer a party to the appeal. Second, when it was a party, ecobee agreed with Ollnova that the district court's relevant claim construction of the "suspended" limitation was correct, and that the Board's relevant claim construction was erroneous. The opinion quotes the appellee's brief at page 1 for that agreement. It states that, because ecobee was never advocating before the court a position Ollnova sought to preclude, there was never any need to decide whether ecobee is collaterally estopped.

On the district court's construction, the opinion disagrees that the Board erred by disregarding it. The opinion states that the Board's analysis addressed, and rejected, both the district court's construction and Ollnova's construction. It states that although the Board is not bound by a district court's claim construction, and has an independent obligation to resolve claim construction disputes, the Board is obligated to consider the district court's construction if the parties present it. The opinion quotes 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b): "Any prior claim construction determination concerning a term of the claim in a civil action, or a proceeding before the International Trade Commission, that is timely made of record in the inter partes review proceeding will be considered." It cites Ethanol Boosting Sys., LLC v. Ford Motor Co., 162 F.4th 1151, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2025), for the point that the court has not "impose[d] a blanket rule requiring the Board to always evaluate the merits of any prior claim constructions." The opinion states that the Board complied with the obligation here.

The opinion states that the Board considered the district court's construction, in large part through Ollnova's proposed construction, which the opinion describes as immaterially different from the district court's. It states that the Board expressly recited the district court's construction, at footnote 8 of the decision. It states that the Board gave that construction little weight, and that the Board was not required to give it any particular weight. The opinion's conclusion on this argument is: "We discern no error."

The court's construction of "suspended"

On the merits, the opinion states that Ollnova argues the Board's construction is incorrect because "suspended" should not encompass both "where a transmission that would otherwise occur is suspended by an action such as overriding a flag" and "where a transmission is not made because there is no change in an indicator or a change does not exceed a limit." The opinion says the issue "is a somewhat close issue," illustrated by the fact that, at an earlier point in this appeal, Ollnova and ecobee agreed with the district court's narrower construction of "suspended," and it states that the court ultimately agrees with the Board. The opinion concludes, as the Board did, that "suspended" encompasses both of those meanings, citing the Board decision at *6.

The opinion states that the plain language of the claim may affirmatively support only the first of those two meanings, and that the claim language does nothing to preclude the second. It states that the specification provides substantial support for the Board's view that "suspended" encompasses both meanings.

For the first meaning, the opinion discusses three examples from the specification. It quotes column 2, lines 20-26: "information may be transmitted in response . . . to a sensed condition being outside a predetermined range or limit. . . . Transmission of information during an interval may be suspended in response to an externally received control signal." It describes a second example, at column 10, lines 63-67, in which the transceiver may communicate the information during the transmission period in response to a triggering event such as detecting whether a flag has been set, and in which the flags may be set in response to detecting or identifying a change in the sensed condition beyond a limit. It quotes a third example. At column 11, lines 53-55, a counter "may count[ ] a number of polling intervals when a change has been detected, such as when a flag has been set." At column 11, lines 56-59, the opinion quotes, with its bracketed alterations: "When the count reaches a maximum or a limit[,] [t]he transceiver may be controlled to suspend the transmission of information [during the] transmission period, until the counter reaches a send limit." The opinion states that these examples contemplate information being suspended based on a signal, a flag, or a counter that may activate upon the detection of a change. It concludes that "suspended" can encompass "where a transmission that would otherwise occur is suspended by an action such as overriding a flag."

For the second meaning, the opinion quotes column 3, lines 35-37: "a transmission of information may be suspended for periods of a transmission interval for which no change in the indicator has been identified." It states that this passage describes a scenario where a transmission is not made, that is, "suspended," because there is "no change in the indicator." A footnote states that the district court did not consider this passage in its construction of "suspended," citing J.A. 1926-27. The opinion also quotes column 11, lines 37-41: "transceiver 216 may transmit information only during a transmission period in which a current difference Di exceeds the difference limit Dl, and may not transmit during intervals in which the current difference Di does not exceed the difference limit Dl." It quotes column 11, lines 8-11: "the processor 214 may control the transceiver 216 to suspend the transmission of information, notwithstanding a flag being set identifying a transmission may be pending." It quotes column 11, lines 11-15: "The transceiver may also transmit information in response to a number of successive transmission periods in which information was not transmitted. The event also may be an absence of a value for the sensed condition from the sensor 209." The opinion states that, in context, "suspend" and "may not transmit" are used more or less interchangeably. It concludes that "suspended" can also encompass "where a transmission is not made because there is no change in an indicator or a change does not exceed a limit." Its summary is that the Board properly read the claim in view of the specification by relying on the specification's repeated use of "suspended."

Substantial evidence on Kates-711

The opinion states that Ollnova contends Kates-711 does not disclose, teach, or suggest the claimed "transmission interval," and specifically that the Board relied on the same process loop in Figure 7 for both the "transmission interval" and the "polling interval." The court disagrees. It states that the Board's finding that Kates-711 discloses the limitations of claim 1, including the "transmission interval" and "polling interval" limitations, is supported by substantial evidence. It states that Ollnova is incorrect in asserting that the Board conflated the two intervals. The Board found that Kates-711 teaches the "polling interval" limitation based on block 706, citing the decision at *8-9, and that block 707 discloses the "transmission interval," citing *11-12.

The opinion quotes Kates-711 at column 15, lines 57-62. If "no fault occurs during the sleep period, then when the specified sleep period has expired, the process enters a block 706 where the sensor unit 102 takes a sensor reading from the sensor(s) 201. The sensor data is subsequently sent to the monitoring computer 113 in a report block 707." The opinion states that substantial evidence supports the Board's finding that Kates-711's report block 707 corresponds to the recited "a period of the transmission interval" because block 707 is a period of time when "sensor data is . . . sent to the monitoring computer."

The opinion states that Ollnova also contends Kates-711 does not disclose the claimed "period of the transmission interval" during which "transmission . . . is suspended." The court disagrees. It states that the Board's finding that Kates-711 discloses limitation [1.e] is supported by substantial evidence, citing the decision at *13. It states that Figure 7 shows steps 708, 709, and 710 subsequent to report block 707, and that Ollnova "conceded at the oral hearing [before the Board] that the progression of steps in the loop shown in Figure 7 does not stop if transmission is suspended during report block 707." It states that substantial evidence supports the Board's finding that Kates-711 discloses "wherein transmission of the most recent reading of the indicator . . . is suspended in response to detecting a [change] in the sensed condition within the predetermined range."

The opinion states that the court has considered Ollnova's remaining arguments and finds them unpersuasive. It states: "Accordingly, we affirm." The disposition line is "AFFIRMED".

Judge Stark's concurrence

Judge Stark writes that he agrees with Judge Cunningham's opinion and joins it in full. He writes separately about a question the appeal appeared to present at the time it was argued: "if an IPR petitioner and patent owner agree with a district court's construction of a previously-disputed term in parallel litigation involving the same patent, should we nonetheless evaluate the claim construction of the Board de novo and, potentially, affirm based on a construction that no party to the appeal is advocating?" He writes: "I think this is an important, and difficult, question, and one we may need to confront eventually."

He writes that if there had been no dispute at the Board as to the correct construction of the "suspend" term, there would have been no reason for the Board, sua sponte, to have construed the term. He quotes U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997): "Claim construction is a matter of resolution of disputed meanings and technical scope, to clarify and when necessary to explain what the patentee covered by the claims, for use in the determination of infringement [and invalidity]." The citation's parenthetical states that emphasis was added. He also cites SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 366 (2018), for the explanation that in an inter partes review the petition "guide[s] the life" of the proceeding. His footnote states that in this case there was a dispute at the Board as to the meaning of "suspend."

He writes that it is not clear to him that the situation should be any different on appeal. At the time the case was briefed and argued, he writes, there was no claim construction dispute. At that point, ecobee agreed with Ollnova that the district court's construction of the "suspend" term is correct and further agreed that the appeal should be resolved by applying that construction. He quotes United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371, 375 (2020), on the party-presentation principle: "[W]e rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present."

He writes that the reasons for not re-evaluating the undisputed construction would have been stronger because, at the time the case was argued, the parallel district court litigation was ongoing, and both parties wanted the district court to apply its construction of the "suspend" term and not the Board's broader construction. Had the court nonetheless reviewed and affirmed the Board's different construction, he writes, the court would have decided the appeal on grounds no one was advocating, and would have unraveled the parties' agreement that the district court case be decided by application of the district court construction.

He writes that he does not mean to suggest those points would have been decisive had ecobee not subsequently dropped out of the appeal, and had the district court case not been dismissed. He calls the question of what the court should have done in that circumstance a tough question. He writes that claim construction is a question of law, and that there is something unsettling in the notion that parties to an appeal could craft their positions in a manner that might prevent the court from determining the correct construction. He cites Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 545-48 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting). He concludes that events following submission of the case have removed any hint of these issues from the appeal, that he fully agrees with the court's resolution of the matters remaining, and that he joins his colleagues in affirming the Board.